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The common law, of which property law comprises a substantial branch,
claims as its chief advantage the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
But the rules of property law that courts develop, argues Theodore Steinberg,
are inherently incapable of "master[ing] nature in all its complexity, 100
percent" (p. 7). Converting everything into property does "not just confuse[,]
but impoverish[es] our relationship with the natural world" (p. 10). Steinberg
recounts five entertaining parables that question the meaning and extent of the
institution of property.
Steinberg approaches the problem of universal commodification from an
angle foreign to mainstream legal scholarship. Rather than couching his
argument in moral' or efficiency2 justifications, Steinberg attempts to prove
his point on "silly" grounds. He contends that it is fatuous to determine who
owns shoreline on the basis of its adjoining body of water (pp. 52-81) or on
the basis of how a river changes course (pp. 21-51). Therefore, Americans
should abandon attempts to force natural resources into their system of
property law. Although Steinberg succeeds in his narrow mission of exposing
the limits of property law, disappointingly, his argument-by-parable fails to
propose any alternatives that would ameliorate the shortcomings he reveals.
Steinberg commences with the claim that "[t]wentieth-century America is
a society obsessed with mastering nature technologically, a society bent on
redesigning the natural world, no matter what the cost" (p. 6). As a prefatory
illustration of nature's refusal to comport with property law, he recounts Mark
"W\vain's tale of a quiet title action against a downhill plot of land onto which
a mudslide had caused an uphill tract to slide (pp. 3-4).3 Steinberg then
* Assistant Professor of History, New Jersey Institute of Technology and Rutgers University, Newark.
. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1871-74, 1885-86
(1987) (arguing that commodification of all things "does violence to our conception of human flourishing");
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 940
(1985) (arguing that limiting marketability ensures that merit goods will remain with intended beneficiaries).
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970, 990 (1985)
(restraints on alienation control externalities and commons problems when "direct remedies for misuse...
are costly and uncertain to administer"); Rose-Ackerman, supra note I, at 938-39 (arguing that transaction
and information costs of internalizing externalities may be too high to rely on market to ensure efficiency).
3. See MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 705-09 (Library of Am. 1984) (1872). The fluxional hillside
involved was the aptly named Slide Mountain. The rule of the case, albeit litigated as a prank, was that,
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chronicles a series of property disputes, beginning with the concrete
(determinations of land boundaries altered by rivers, pp. 23-514) and
concluding with the exceedingly ethereal (the transferable "air rights" created
by New York City's zoning scheme, pp. 135-655). Property law distinguishes
between "common" and "exclusive use" property.6 Disputes over land
boundaries, shoreline (pp. 52-817), and air rights fall into the latter category,
while conflicts over underground water rights (pp. 82-1058) and weather
rights (pp. 106-349) fall into the former. Through each of these case studies,
Steinberg reiterates his refrain that, although "[p]roperty law transforms nature
into ownable things[,] not everything on earth is equally ownable" (p. 18).
Steinberg submits that the problem of owning nature derives from the twin
forces of a "culture so dedicated to control, so obsessed with possession"
(p. 23) and the development of technology that allows Americans to "control"
further and thereby commodify nature (pp. 107-09). He makes his point about
although the uphill owner acquired the downhill plot, the downhill owner maintained title to his buried tract
and "had a right to dig it out from under there." Id. at 709.
4. Whether the Omaha Indians continued to own a piece of land ceded to them by treaty would be
determined by whether it slowly eroded into the Missouri River, with the sediment accumulating on the
opposite shore, or whether the river had suddenly changed course. Property law distinguishes between the
former kind of change, called an accretion, and the latter, an avulsion. Slow losses (and gains) of land are
borne by (or redound to) the shore's owner. See Gifford v. Yarborough, 130 Eng. Rep. 1023, 1024 (H.L.
1828) (finding that land that forms slowly upon shoreline would "remain for years, perhaps for ever,
barren" if owned by King). In contrast, avulsions leave title to the land with the original owner.
The Supreme Court is no stranger to such boundary disputes. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 116
S. Ct. 290, 293-94 (1995) (holding that island now bordering Louisiana nonetheless remained within state
of Mississippi because "rule of thalweg"--which makes main navigational channel the boundary between
states-has "island exception," which leaves island in hands of originally owning state, even when channel
shifts to opposite side of island), decree entered, 116 S. Ct. 560 (1995).
5. He recounts several transfers of air rights that raise issues germane to the book, including the one
that led to the well-known case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6. Herman Melville characterized all property as either a "fast fish" or a "loose fish." See HERMAN
MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 331-34 (Harrison Hayford & Hershel Parker eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 1967)
(1851) ("I. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it. II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can
soonest catch it."). Steinberg recalls this dichotomy: "As Mark Twain might have said, Show me a fast fish
and I'll show you a fish that is a lot looser than you think" (p. 19).
7. Ownership of new shoreline in Louisiana depends upon whether the body of water is a lake-for
which new shoreline accrues to the adjacent landowners-or a river--the shores of which escheat to the
state by statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court set forth a multifactor test to determine that Six Mile Lake
was aptly designated, and that the oil-rich land under its shores did not belong to the state. See Louisiana
v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154, 175 (La. 1974). Steinberg contends that a multi-factor analysis cannot
"succeed in totally capturing and appropriating a physical reality 100 percent" (p. 81).
8. Arizona employed the rule of prior appropriation-which entities a person to take water in the
amount of his initial claim, so long as all earlier claimants have been satisfied in their like entitlements-for
surface water. The statute, however, did not apply to subterranean water, which became a problem with
the improvement of pumping technology. Bristor v. Cheatham, 255 P.2d 173 (Ariz. 1953), the culmination
of the ensuing disputes, remedied this statutory lacuna by establishing a reasonable-use standard, which
restricts landowners to taking only water from under their land that they will put to beneficial use on that
land. Id. at 178.
9. A group of Pennsylvania orchard owners used cloud seeding to reduce damaging hailstorms. A
group of farmers sued, alleging that the seeding reduced rain over their fields. The court ruled that clouds
and the moisture therein are common property not subject to the orcharders' private appropriation.
Pennsylvania Natural Weather Ass'n v. Blue Ridge Weather Modification Ass'n, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 749,
759-60 (C.P. Fulton County 1968) ("We hold specifically that every landowner has a property right in the
clouds and the water in them.").
2298
Book Note
a culture of property most forcefully through his portrayal of the conflicts that
develop when two cultures disagree over the concept of "owning" a particular
natural resource. To wit, when the United States directed the Omaha not to
occupy land the tribe thought available for its use, the tribe objected, reasoning
that there can and should be no ownership of land.'0 Similarly, a group of
farmers who sought to enjoin orcharders from altering the weather to their
advantage wished not to control the weather but rather merely to allow nature
to take its course." Thus, suggests Steinberg, imposing a property regime
upon a property-chary culture can destroy that culture.
Technology that facilitates the capture of natural resources likewise fuels
the growth of property rules. 12 The use (and potential overuse) of these
technologies to claim resources exclusively, posits Steinberg, ultimately leads
to the destruction of the natural resources. For example, improved pumps
enabled Arizona farmers to possess and exploit greater quantities of water,
which not only depleted the resource but also increased ground subsidence
(pp. 89-91). Likewise, only upon the invention of skyscrapers and complex
cantilevers did air rights truly matter (p. 140). 13 Technology enables a culture
"obsessed with possession" (p. 23) to expand greatly the set of ownable things.
As ownership expands, the more preposterous that ownership appears, and the
more inevitable the destruction of natural resources becomes.
Indisputably, the market-and its attendant rhetoric-pervades American
society.14 Steinberg's failure, however, to advance an alternative cultural
system that satisfies his objections leaves the reader muttering "yeah, but so
what?" Indeed, he never acknowledges that, although property has the
shortcomings he identifies, it nonetheless likely reigns supreme in the world
of second best. 15 Presenting only objections, Steinberg leaves no clew
10. The Omaha wondered how "one person [could] own land to the exclusion of other men" (p. 27).
See also Tecumseh, quoted in JOHN BARrLErT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 370 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed.
1992) ("Sell a country! Why not sell the air, the clouds, and the great sea, as well as the earth? Did not
the Great Spirit make them all for the use of his children?").
i1. Steinberg phrases the question as whether people should control weather or weather people
(p. 122). One farmer stated that he "'fe[It] that if there has to be a talking to a-what I call the
rainmaker-. . . I would rather do it on my knees, not on the telephone"' (p. 127).
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 35 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that in
primitive society-without means of improving land or defining boundaries-cost of defining property
rights exceeds benefits, resulting in common "ownership").
13. Steinberg concedes that the culture of air rights perhaps "saved" New York's historical landmarks.
The skyrocketing value of real estate and the ability to build vertically inevitably destroy landmarks,
typically by the erection of buildings thereabove. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY
1205-06 (3d ed. 1993) (depicting architect's proposals to build skyscraper atop Grand Central Station). The
ability to transfer these rights-useless to a preservation-oriented landmark owner, but valuable to a
developer-enables a landmark to remain undisturbed on its plot of land (pp. 148-49). Steinberg tempers
his slight praise for this form of property, however, with the claim that, although air rights "solve some
problems, they force the ideology of exchange further into the marrow of daily existence" (p. 154).
14. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (upholding extension of commerce
power to impose quotas on wheat grown for farmer's personal use).
15. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1247 (1968) ("An
alternative to the commons need not be perfectly just to be preferable.... [W]e put up with [property]
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indicating a more desirable path to be followed by a culture obsessed with
property. His analysis of technology's role in the development of property is
similarly wanting. While technology indubitably has fueled the increased
pervasiveness of property, 6 Steinberg fails to point in any direction with his
evidence. Is he a neo-Luddite, wishing that Americans abandon technological
progress? 7 Or does he just reject particular uses of technology?' 8
In a world of plenty, no market need form; moreover, because use of a
resource is costless, no one will dispute ownership. Scarcity, therefore, drives
Steinberg's conflicts, a fact that he fails to give more than passing
acknowledgment.' 9 Although Steinberg meets his goal of "rais[ing] questions
about the limits of private property" (p. 8), these questions only beget more
difficult (and stimulating) questions: What alternatives to exclusive property
exist? What makes those rules more effective? Even an allocation that places
some resources outside the market is a property allocation in some sense. The
resource is then "owned" by all, the state, or those best able-by strength or
guile-to expropriate it for themselves.
because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system. The alternative
of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin.").
Steinberg's objections may reflect an hostility to the distribution of property: "[Property law] is not
a language that everyone benefits from equally" (p. 7); "The weather was [before its control] a vast leveling
force that paid no attention to wealth, character, class, or the kind of car one drove" (p. 115). But he fails
to analyze outcomes under alternative rules that may disadvantage certain groups even more. See, e.g., E.N.
Anderson, Jr., A Malaysian Tragedy of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF TiE COMMONS: THE CULTURE
AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 327, 339 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987)
[hereinafter THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS] ("It is almost inevitable that, in a conflict over a declining
resource base, the strong displaces the weak. Allowing a tragedy of the commons can be seen as a policy
of favoring the rich without appearing to do so."); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of
Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 42 (1985) (explaining that
Kwakiutl implemented system of "potlatching"--gifts granted from successful fishing seasons to other
clans--to avoid "bloody wars" of earlier times).
16. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 35; see also Robert A. Brightman, Conservation and Resource
Depletion: The Case of the Boreal Forest Algonquians, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note
15, at 121, 129 (finding that technology "significantly lowered costs of pursuit and capture and increased
rates of capture" of game in one Native American tribe). Steinberg never addresses whether technology
causes the increased use of property rules, or whether only cultures that implement property responses to
improved technology survive. See Anderson, supra note 15, at 334-35 (arguing that government's failure
to solve commons problem led to destruction of fishing culture); see also Brightman, supra, at 129
(positing that new technology but old traditions led to depletion of game and decline of hunting culture);
Patricia Nealon, He's Last in a Fishing Line-Down to the Sea No More, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 1995,
at 25 (describing how overfishing of George's Bank has led fishing families to abandon their trade).
17. The Luddites destroyed manufacturing machinery, believing it would otherwise leave all workers
unemployed. For a modem-day version of a similar philosophy, see, for example, Equipment is Sabotaged
at Logging Site, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 20, 1995, at B5 (reporting destruction of logging
equipment to halt harvesting of old-growth forest). See also Unabombler] Manifesto, WASH. POST, Sept.
20, 1995, Special Section, paras. 125-35 ("[W]hile the industrial system is sick we must destroy it. If we
compromise with it and let it recover from its sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our freedom.").
18. Restricting the use of particular technologies in taking a resource can reduce the strain upon it.
See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 19-21.
19. He notes that "opposition" to cloud seeding was "inversely proportional to rainfall" (p. 121), and
offers the more general proposition that, "[w]here there is money to be made by controlling nature, it is
a safe bet that there will be conflicts over property and ownership" (p. 84).
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Several alternate allocative rules might satisfactorily replace the exclusive-
possession tradition that troubles Steinberg. Margaret Radin argues that a rule
of "market inalienability" which "places some things outside the marketplace,
but not outside the realm of social intercourse" may reduce the problems of
universal commodification. 20  For example, although cloud seeding has
beneficial uses,2' when made available to private parties, its misuse is
virtually assured.22 Market inalienability resembles placing exclusive control
and distribution of a resource in government. 23 To wit, New York City holds
the right to distribute all unappropriated air space according to its zoning plan,
granting builders use of its air only on certain conditions.24 This rule has the
advantage of allocating the resource outside the market; unfortunately, it has
the disadvantage of allocating the resource outside the market. Although this
allocation may have the force of principle, it can often lead to worse
consequences for the resource itself.25 Furthermore, it allocates resources to
those best able to operate through the political system rather than the market.
Steinberg laments the decline of the system of estates and landholding
used before capitalism converted land into a commodity (pp. 11-12). In this
system, possession was for a limited duration, not eternity, and holders had a
duty to protect subsequent holders' interests.26 Owners held "life estates" in
20. See Radin, supra note 1, at 1853. Radin opposes markets in such items as babies, sexual services,
and bodily organs, see id. at 1862-63 & 1863 n.51, because the mere existence of a market leads people
to consider these goods in monetary terms, id. at 1925-26. Allowing the transfer, but not sale, of such
things avoids the complete commodification inevitable in a market while preserving the benefits of
transfers. Id. at 1932-33.
21. See, e.g., Slutsky v. City of N.Y., 97 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (holding resort had no
right to enjoin cloud seeding undertaken to induce rain for reducing drought in New York City).
22. Susan Rose-Ackerman proposes prohibiting sales in order to reduce strain on a resource. See Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 1, at 942-43. Carol Rose suggests limiting access to the commons to the original
users. See Rose, supra note 18, at 18-19. If these insiders are too numerous, however, both solutions lose
their efficacy.
23. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471,484-85 (1970) (listing three justifications for keeping some resources
available to all on equal terms); see also U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Congress has power to regulate
and "dispose of... Property belonging to the United States.").
24. See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261, 265 (1946) (Congress may declare "air is
a public highway" but low approaches to airport may nonetheless constitute a taking); Hinman v. Pacific
Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) ("The owner of land owns as much of the space above him
as he uses, but only so long as he uses it. All that lies beyond belongs to the world."), cert. denied, 300
U.S. 654 (1937); Pennsylvania Natural Weather Ass'n v. Blue Ridge Weather Modification Ass'n, 44 Pa.
D. & C.2d 749,760 (C.P. Fulton County 1968) (holding that, although private parties may not alter weather
to their advantage, such modification may be undertaken by government in public interest).
25. See RICHARD L. STROUP & JOHN A. BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES: BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT45-50 (1983) (comparing destructive Bureau of Land Management policies
to environmentally astute management of marshland owned by Audubon Society). People in a system
acculturated to property may act according to their recognized greater stake. Steinberg tacitly acknowledges
this when he quotes a would-be purchaser of property on the moon: "'It will really make me enjoy our
lovely moon 10 times more if I know I own two acres up there' (p. 168).
26. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 138 cmt. d (1936) (life estate holder has duty not to "remove
for sale" minerals, timber, or other resources); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 13, at 231-33
(discussing application of waste doctrine). Waste doctrine, however, revolves around maximizing the market
value of an estate more than establishing a caretaker relationship between holder and the held. See POSNER,
supra note 12, at 73.
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natural resources, entitling them only to reasonable use during life.27 This rule
might preserve the petroleum wealth underneath the disputed shores of Six
Mile Lake.28 The estate holder's obligation to preserve for future holders the
same bundle-including oil-that came to her may thus create an ethos of
stewardship and preservation, replacing incentives to despoil the environment.
Granting natural resources rights unto themselves might most please
Steinberg. Rather than considering nature exclusively through a human
lens-how best can humans use certain water; which person may control the
weather for her benefit-we could ascribe to resources their own rights.29
Each time a person appropriates a natural resource, a court could enjoin that
taking or require compensation for the full value of the resource.30 Despite
its moral illumination, this approach merely proposes to reallocate the right
from one interested human to another.
Although Steinberg's examples capably support his claim that "not
everything on earth is equally ownable" (p. 18), he fails to take the obligatory
next step and suggest a method by which society may leave resources
"unowned," while restraining people from using them unreasonably. Far more
interesting would be the sequel in which he portrays innovative solutions to
problems like those in Slide Mountain, solutions that both remedy the
allocation problem and avoid his criticisms of commodification.
-Andrew Jackson Heimert
Looking to the example of the "Noble Savage"--the Native American tribes that reputedly lived with
nature, respecting it as an equal-to support the claim that cultures can live with nature without ruining
it may be mistaken. Some tribal cultures had "religions" that valued the excessive killing of animals. See
Brightman, supra note 16, at 130-31 (noting Algonquian belief that killing animals increased their number
through reincarnation); see also Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toivard Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 464-66, 494 (1972) ("[N]otwithstanding the vaunted
'harmony' between the American Plains Indians and Nature, once they had equipped themselves with rifles
their pursuit of Buffalo expanded to fill the technological potential."). To be fair, Brightman posits that the
tribes were unaware of the cause-effect relationship between hunting and animal depletion. See Brightman,
supra note 16, at 132. This leads to the question whether an innocent, yet ineffectual system should be
preferred to a (allegedly) morally bankrupt, yet effective system.
27. To the life estate we might add the concept of a joint tenancy, in which each tenant (or human)
"owns" the whole, but has no rights to give to heirs. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 13, at 326;
Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 163, 234 (1992).
28. See Louisiana v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154, 167 (La. 1973) (Bamham, J., dissenting)
(decision withdrawn and superseded) ("The majority opinion ... portends the most catastrophic effect of
any case in recent years upon the public fisc, our natural resources, our ecology, our environment, and the
public in general.").
29. See Stone, supra note 26, at 464-66, 474 ("Why should the environment be of importance only
indirectly, as lost profits to someone else?" (emphasis omitted)). "Deep ecology" provides an even stronger
view. See, e.g., Bill Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299, 311 (1980) ("Man
is an integral part of nature, not over or apart from nature.").
30. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Contemporary
public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation."). But see John M. Naff, Jr., Reflections on the
Dissent of Douglas, J., in Sierra Club v. Morton, 58 A.B.A. J. 820, 820 (1972) ("How can I rest beneath
a tree/ If it may soon be suing me?/ Or enjoy the playful porpoisel While it's seeking habeas corpus?").
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